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I. Introduction 
5ince the onset of the Asian crisis , what characterizes the East 
Asian exchange rates has been a topic of considerable discussion. 
In the pre-crisis period , it was fairly evident that currencies of most 
East Asian economies maintained de facto pegs to the U.5. dollar. 
Among the East Asian economies , Hong Kong was the only East 
Asian economy that adopted the fixed exchange rate regime backed 
by a currency board arrangement. It was , however , well known that 
currencies in the other East Asian economies had maintained 
highly stable values against the U .5. dollar since the mid -1980s 
(see , for example , Frankel and Wei (1 994) , Goldberg and Klein 
(1 997). and Ogawa (2001)).1 
The de facto pegs to the U .5. dollar sometimes destabilized the 
real “ effective" exchange rates of these currencies in the pre-crisis 
period. In particular , as the Japanese yen depreciated against the 
U.5. dollar from April 1995 to the summer of 1997, apprecia디on of 
the real 녕ffective" exchange rates reduced the export competi디ve­
ness and increased current account deficits in the East Asian 
economies (see , for example , Corsetti. Pesenti , and Roubini (1 999). 
and Ito. Ogawa , and 5asaki (1 998)). 5everal economists have. thus. 
proposed 안le desirability of intermediate exchange rate regimes in 
East Asia that might stabilize their effective exchange rates (see. for 
example , Benassy-Quere (1999). Willi밍nson (1 999 , 200이. Rajan 
(2002)). The bipolar or two-corner solution view of exchange rates , 
in contrast. states that intermediate policy regìmes between hard 
pegs and floa디ng are not sustainable (see. for example. Fischer 
(200 1)).2 The post -crisis experience in East Asia taught us that the 
road to the intermediate exchange rate regimes in the region would 
be pret양 hard.3 
lTakagi (1999) is an exceptional study that found some significant 
correlations between the East Asian currencies and the ,Japanese yen 
during 야1is period. 
2Fischer. however. argued that the proponents of the bipolar view have 
probably exaggerated their point. Frankel (1999) discussed that no single 
currency regime is right for all countries or at all times 
3Bayoumi. Eichengreen. and Mauro (2000. 2001) showed that on 
economic criteria. ASEAN appears less suited for a region려 currency 
arr밍1gement than Europe before the Maastricht Treaty, although the 
difference is not large. 
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TABLE 1 






November 1978-June 1997 
July 1997-December 2000 
March 1980-0ctober 1997 
November 1997-December 2000 
January 1986-February 1990 
March 1990-November 1992 








December 1992-September 1998 Managed Floating 
September 1998-December 2000 Pegged Arrangement 
The Philippines January 1988-December 2000 Independently Floating 
Thailand January 1970-June 1997 
July 1997-December 2000 
Fixed 
Independently Floa디ng 
Source: Intemational Financìal Statistics (Various Issues) . 
ln the post-crisis period, Hong Kong kept its currency board 
arrangement and the Chinese yuan virtually maintained its peg to 
the U.S. dollar. After experiencing some transitional regime. 
Malaysia started pegging to the U.S. dollar on September 1st 1998. 
In contrast. Thailand , lndonesia , and Korea as well as the 
Philippines and Taiwan have adopted managed float since 삼le crisi.s 
(see Table 1). After going through steep devaluations 없ld high 
vola디lity in 1997-8, their currencies have mostly stabilized over the 
past few years. Hemandez and Montiel (2001) have suggested that 
they are now 려lowed to float more at low frequencies than before 
1997-8. Some other observers, however, have argued that the 
so-called floa디ng exch하1ge regimes of the coun띠es are not realJy 
floa디ng when we look at high-frequency day-to-day observations 
(Kawai and Akiyama 2000; McKinnon 2001; and McKinnon and 
Schnabl 2002). In particular, u sing a regression framework from 
Frankel and Wei (1994) , 삼ley interpreted that the East Asian 
currencies were rever디ng back to de facto pegs against the U.딩. 
doll하 4 
4Calvo and Reinhart (2002) found that m잉ly emerging market countries 
that say they allow their exchange rate to f10at mostly do not. 
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The purpose of this paper is to inves디gate what affected the 
post-crisis exchange rates of five East Asian countries: Singapore , 
Thailand , Korea , Taiwan , and Malaysia. During the crisis , several 
East Asian countries shifted their exchange rate regimes from de 
facto U.S. Dollar pegs to managed float. In the fo11o\\끼ng post-crisis 
period , the East Asian countries except for Malaysia had no 
institutional switch of exchange rate regimes. It is thus far from 
clear why the East Asian currencies reverted back to de facto pegs 
against the U .S. do11ar in the late 1990s. Based on intra-daily 
observations , we examine how and when these five East Asian 
currencies changed their correlations with the U.S. do11ar and the 
Japanese yen. Du디ng the time zones when East Asian (and 
Europeanl markets were closed, we find that the East Asian 
currencies kept strong correlations with the U.S. do11ar throughout 
the post-crisis pe디od. We , however , find structural breaks in the 
correlations during the time zones when East Asian markets are 
open. In the post-crisis period, the first structural break arose 
when Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange rate on September 1st 
1998. The second structural break occurred when Indonesia and 
Thailand adopted inflation targe디ng in early 2000. 
During the time zones when East Asian markets were open , 
several East Asian currencies , par디cularly those of ASEAN , 
temporarily increased correlations with the Japanese yen in the 
post-crisis period. The increased correlations were conspicuous 
before September 1st 1998. However , after Malaysia adopted the 
fixed exchange rate , the East Asian currencies , par디cularly the 
Singapore do11ar and the Thai baht, increased correlations with the 
U.S. do11ar. After early 2000 , most of the East Asian currencies 
increased correlations with the U .8. do11ar and began rever디ng back 
to de facto pegs against the U.S. do11ar even during the time zones 
when East Asian markets are open. 
Korea started inflation targe디ng in September 1998. However , 
inflation targeting in Korea was not binding when Korean economy 
experienced unexpectedly dramatic recovery. It was early 2000 
when inflation targeting became binding for Korean monetary 
policy. In contrast, inflation targe디ng was binding in Indonesia and 
Thailand soon after its introduction. It is therefore highly possible 
that there was a structural break of monetary p이icy in Indonesia , 
Thailand, and Korea in early 2000. Since the share 0 1' imports in 
consump디on goods is large in these open economies, the structural 
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break of monetary policy might have affected their exchange rale 
policies. IIn particular. since the U.S. dollar has been dominant in 
invoice c‘urrencies in their imports (see. for example. Fukuda 
(1 995)). the introduction of inflation targe디ng might have increased 
their incentives to stabilize their exchange rates against 야le U.S. 
dollar. 
A noteworthy implica디on from our ernpirical results is that a 
regime switch in an East Asian coun다y had an enormously larg:e 
impact on the exchange rates of other East Asian countries that 
had no regime switch. This probably reflects the fact that economjc 
linkage among East Asian countries is tight in monetary and real 
transactions. A regime switch in a country had a strong impact on 
its neighboring economies and that the affected economies had 
another limpacts on their neighboring economies. Our empirical 
studies support this view and suggest that the exchange rate 
linkage was very important to see why the post-crisis East Asian 
countries had a tendency rever디ng back to de facto pegs against 
the U.S. dollar 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II theoretically considers 
how exchange rates can be linkecl in East Asia. After explaining the 
rnethod of estirnations and the data in section III. secUon IV 
investigates how large irnpacts the regime switches in some Ea~;t 
Asian country had on the post-crisis exchange regimes in Ea~;t 
Asian countries. Sections V and V1 provide formal tests to explore 
the existence of structural breaks. Section VIl examines how 
volatili양 of exchange rates chan당ed in tlle post-crisis period. Aftn 
providing alternative interpretations in section VIII. section DC 
summarizes our main results and refers to their implica디ons. 
11. Linkages of the Exchange Rates in East Asia: An Example 
ln order to understand the interdependence of exchange rates in 
East Asian economies , this section theoretically considers an 
exchange rate that is determined by the weighted average of 
exchange rates of m~or trade partners. The Singapore dollar undc:r 
a currency basket regime is a par디cular ex따nple for such an 
exchange rate. For analytical simplicity. we suppose that the 
Sin당apore dollar is determined by a basket of the U.S. dollar. the 
Japanese yen. and the Malaysia ringgit. All of the exchange rates 
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are denominated by a common numeraire currency such as the 
Swiss Franc. Denoting the nominal exchange rates of the U.S. 
dollar, the Japanese yen , 암le Singapore dollar, 밍ld the Malaysia 
디nggit by USDt, JPYt, SDt, and MRt respectively , the grow암1 rate of 
Singapore dollar is written as 
L1SDt=al . L1 USDt+a2 . L1JPYt+aa . L1MRt+ Et. (1) 
where L1Et is the growth rate of an exchange rate Et (E=USD , JPY, 
SD , and MR). and Et is a disturbance term. 
If the growth rate of the Malaysia 디n잃.it (L1 MRt) is determined by 
L1MRt=bI . L1 USDt+b2 . L1JPYt+b3 . L1SDt+ η( ， (2) 
where η t is a disturbance term , equa디ons (1) 없ld (2) lead to 
a1 +aa . b I a2+aa . b2 
L1 SDt= L1 USDt + L1JPYt + ν t (3) 
1 - a3 . b3 1 - a3 . b3 
b I+al' b3 b2+a2' b3 
L1 MR, = L1 USDt +•• -L1JPY,+ ι (4) 
1-a3.b3 1 • a3' b3 
where νl드 (Et+a3 . ηt)/ (l -a3 . b3) and St 드 (b3 . Et + ηtl / (1 - a3 . b3). 
To the extent that Et and η ， are independent of LlUSDt and 
L1JPYt , equa디on (3) indicates that how the Singapore dollar is 
correlated with the U .S. dollar and with the Japanese yen depends 
not only the basket weights of the Singapore dollar in (1) but also 
on the basket weights of the Malaysia ringgit in (2). Thus , even if 
Singapore keeps its basket weights constan t, the regime switch of 
the M려aysian exchange rate policy c밍1 have a significant impact 
on the Singapore dollar , particular when a3 is large. 
For example , suppose that the basket weights of the Singapore 
dollar are based on trade weights 밍nong five major trade partners. 
Then , noting that the Hong Kong dollar is fixed to the U.S. dollar, 
Singapore ’s trade weights in 1997 imply that al=0.413 1, a2= 
0.2205 , and a3=0.287 1.5 Therefore , when the weights of the 
1be weights we use the fl이lowing calculations are based on IMF. 
Direction of Trade Statistics. various issues. 
EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES lN EAST ASJA 125 
TABLE 2 
T!-IEORETICAL WEIGHTS OF THE EXCHANGE RATES BASEO ON TRAOE WEIGHTS 





























(2) TheoreticaJ weights after September 1. 1998 
: The Case of the Singapore dollar 









Notes: 1) The t삼heoretica떠1 we히ight엄s in (I) were calculated based on trad 
we히ight않s in 1997 . 
2) After September 1st 1998. the theoretical weights in cases 1. 2. 
and 3 were caJculated based on the trade weights in 1997. 1998. 
and 1999 respectively. 
Malaysia ringgit are a1so based on the trade weights among five 
major trade partners in 1997, that is. b , = 0.2896. b2 = 0 .2830. and 
b3 = 0 .2833 , equations (3) 잉ld (4) lead to theoretical correlations :in 
Table 1.6 They indicate that both the Malaysia ringgit 하ld the 
Singapore dollar have slightly larger correlation with the U.S. dollar 
than with the Japanese yen. πle weights of the Japanese yen. 
however. amount to more than 0 .3 in both currencies before 
Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange rate. 
In contrast, when the Malaysia ringgit is fixed to the U.S. dollar. 
it holds that L1MRt = L1USDt, 야lat is , b l = 1. and b2 = b3= O. 
Subs디tuting the trade wei양lts in 1997, 1998. and 1999 into QI. Q.2. 
and ~ respectively. we obtain Table 2. The table summarizes 
theoretical correlations of the Singapore dollar with the U.S. dollar 
and the Japanese yen after Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange 
rate. 
Comparing the theoretical correlations in Table 2 with those in 
Table 1, the weight of the U.S. dollar rose from 0 .54 to 0 .7. while 
~he vaJues of Q , and b, are calcu!ated by the sum of the trade weights 
to the U.S.A and those to Hong Kong. 
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the weight of the Japanese yen declined from 0.328 to 0.2. This 
implies that the switch of the Malaysian exchange rate regime had 
significant impacts on the theoretical correlations of the Singapore 
dollar. It is noteworthy that these changes occurred even ìf 
Singapore did not switch its exchange rate regime. These changes 
are attributable to 안le high degree of interdependence between the 
Singapore dollar and the Malaysia rìnggit. 
III. The Estimation Method and Data 
In order to investigate the determinants of exchange rates in the 
East Asian. countries. we use the method of Frankel-Wei to 
estimate the weights of the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen before 
and after the crisis. In this approach , an independent currency is 
chosen as an arbitrary numeraire for measurìng the exchange 
variation. The goal here is to estimate the weight a currency 
assigns to another currency on a given frequency. Suppose that X키 
is the exchange rate of an East Asian country j , where j = 
Singapore , Malaysia , Thailand, Korea, and Taiwan. Suppose also 
that USD t is the U.S. dollar and that JPYt is the Japanese yen. 
The estimated model , where the local currency’s value against the 
independent numeraire currency is regressed against the major 
world currencies , is 암len 
L1XI=constant term+al . L1 USDt +a2 . L1JPYt. (5) 
where L1XI is the growth rate of xl. A heteroskedastici양 and 
autocorrelation consistent covarìance matrix is calculated by the 
method of Newey and West (1 987). In several preliminary estima-
tions , we included the Sterling pound in equa디on (5) as an 
additional explanatory variable. However , the estimated coefficients 
of the Sterling pound were not significantly posi디ve in most cases 
and , if positive , were very small, without changing the other 
estimated coefficients .7 We therefore use only L1 USDt and L1JPYt as 
explanatory varìables in the follm찌ng analysis. 
7The result is consistent with findings in pre띠ous literature that showed 
no significant impact of Mark or Euro in similar regressions. 
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T ABLE 3 
NEW YORK AND TOKYO TrMES lN WHICH O UR INTRA-D AlLY DATA ls AVAJ내BlE 
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The data of each currency's exchange rate is the intra-daily data . 
The data set was downloaded from Datastream. For rnìssing data . 
we supplemented it with the data set in Bloomberg. Table 3 
summarizes what time our int ra -daily data is available in Tokyo 
time and in New York time. Depen띠ng on the availability. the spa.n 
of each time zone varies from 0 .5 to 6 hours. However. except ft)r 
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the Taiwan d이lar ， we can 미assify the exchange rate movements of 
each business day into those when East Asian markets are open , 
those when European markets are open , and those when both East 
Asian and European markets are closed. The classification provides 
us with useful information because local news is usually revealed 
when the market is open. 
As in the previous studies , the following analysis will use the 
Swiss Franc as a numeraire. The Swiss Franc has a desirable 
property as a numeraire because it is widely transacted in inter-
national markets but has little linkage with the East Asian 
currencies. However , the choice of the numeraire might be 
arbitrary. In particular, when there is an idiosyncratic shock on the 
Swiss Franc , the exchange rates denominated by the Swiss Franc 
would show spurious correlations in equation (5). The spurious 
correlations are likely when European markets are open because 
news on the Swiss Franc tends to be revealed during the time 
zone. They are , however, less likely when European markets are 
cIosed. 
We estimate equation (5) for each time zone in four alternative 
sample periods: (i) from January 7th 1997 to June 15th 1997. (ii) 
from February 1st 1998 to the end of August 1998. (iii) from the 
September 2nd 1998 to December 29th 1999. and (iv) from 
January 4th 2000 to September 5th 2002. The period (i) is the 
pre-crisis period. We choose this period in order to see whether the 
pre띠ous results during the pre-crisis period are still confirmed by 
our intra-daily data. We break the post-crisis period into (ii). (iii). 
and (iv). In the post-crisis period. two structural breaks are 
assumed to arise when Malaysia introduced the fixed exchange rate 
regime and when some East Asian countries introduced inflation 
targeting effectively. 
The first break is a natural choice because the Malaysian regime 
shift was the only drastic switch of the exchange rate regime in the 
post-crisis East Asian countries. Before shifting to the fixed 
exch없1ge rate regime , Malaysia was under managed float after the 
crisis. In par디cular ， since early 1998 , the Malaysian government 
had explored a new economic policy. including the stabilization 
policy of real effective exchange rates of the ringgit. 8 The 
8For example. the National Economic Action Council (NEACl. which was 
established by Prime Minister Mahathir in December 1997. announced the 
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FIGURE 1 
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introduction of the flxed exchange rate on September 1st 1998 W 8.S 
therefore a dramatic regime shift in Ma laysia (see Figure 1) . 'We 
start the estimation period of (ii) from the beginnìng of February 
1998. This is because except for the Indonesia n Rupi려1 . most of 
the East Asian countries almost stabilized 다1e exchange rates after 
the end of January 1998. 
The choice of the second structural break may be controversial. 
However, the regime shift in monetary policy c없1 affect 比 e 
exchange rate policy. In particula r. when the share of imports in 
cons umption goods is large. it is important to control exchang;e 
rates to achieve the inflation target. Among ASEAN countrie~，. 
Indonesia announced inflation targe디ng at 삼le beginning of 2000 
and so did Thailand in May 2000. In the case of Korea. inflation 
targeting started in September 1998. However. inflation targe디ng in 
National Economic Recovery Plan fNERP) in August 1998. The plan stressed 
lhe importance of stabilizing the real “ effective" exchange rates and 
proposed the adoption of a trade weighted basket system as a desirab‘e 
exchange rate regime. The plan was based on the idea that the de fac1.o 
pegs to the U.S. dollar some디mes destabilized the real "effective" exchan~:e 
rates. 
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Korea was not bin버ng when Korean economy experienced unex-
pecte이y dramatic recovery. It was early 2000 when inflation 
targe디ng became binding for Korean monetary policy. It is therefore 
highly possible that there was a structural break of monetary policy 
in Indonesia , Thailand, and Korea in ea띠 2000. 
In the following analysis , we inves디gate whether there were 
structural breaks in equa디on (5). In par디cular ， we explore the 
e}깅stence of structura1 breaks not on1y in the country that had a 
regime shift in monetary policy but also in other countries that did 
not. The motivation is to see whether a regime switch in an East 
Asian country had a signific밍1t impact on the exchange rates of 
other East Asian countries that had no regime s뻐tch. If economic 
linkage among East Asian countries is 디ght in monetary and real 
transactions , a regime switch in a country would have a strong 
impact on its neighboring economies and that the affected eco-
nomies would have another impact on their neighboring economies. 
IV. The Estimation Results 
A. From Janua，밍 7th 1997 to June 15th 1997 
We first estimated equation (5) for each available time zone in 
the sample period from January 7th 1997 to June 15th 1997. We 
made the estimations to see whether the previous resu1ts during 
the pre-crisis period are still confirmed by our intra-daily data. 
Table 4 summarizes the estimation results. Our estimations are 
different from previous studies not only in the data frequency but 
also in the sample period. The results , however, almost confirm 
previous ones that were estimated based on less frequency data 
such as daily , weakly, or month1y data. 
In all countries , the estimated coefficient of the U.S. dollar was 
large and was close to one for almost all of the time zones. In 
contrast, the estimated coefficient of the Japanese yen was small 
for all of the 디me zones in all countries. ln Thailand , Korea , and 
Taiwan , the coefficient of the Japanese yen was never significantly 
positive for any time zone. In Malaysia , it was not significantly 
posi디ve except for a time zone. In the case of Singapore , it was 
significantly posi디ve in several time zones. However , even in 
Singapore , the U.S. dollar had the dominant weight in the currency 
TABLE 4 
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Note: ***. ** * indicate the signific뻐ce at 1%. 5%. and 10% level. respectively. 
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basket of the Singapore dollar. In paπicular. 안le estimated 
coefficient of the U.S. dollar was much larger than the theoretical 
one that was calculated by the trade weights in Table 2. The 
results imply that the East Asian currencies were under de Jacto 
pegs against the U.S. dollar. 
The adjusted R2 ’s of the estimated equations were large during 
most of the time zones in Singapore. Taiwan. and Malaysia. In 
contrast. in Korea. the adjusted R2.s were relatively large during the 
time zones between 11:30 and 19:00 in New York time (that is. 
1 :30-9:00 in Tol인o time) but were sm려1 during the other time 
zones. In Thailand. the adjusted R2 was large during 12:00-18:00 
in New York time (that is. 2:00-8:00 in Tokyo time) but it dropped 
down dramatically du디ng the rest of the time zones. πle results 
probably reflect the fact that the Thai baht and the Korean won 
had several modest devaluations ín the fírst half of 1997 before 
experíencing devastating currency attacks. 
B. From February 1 st 1998 to the end oJ August 1998 
We next estimated equa디on (5) for each available time zone in 
the post-crisis period before the Malaysian government shifted its 
exch없1ge rate regime from managed float to the fix exchange rate. 
After the Thai crisis in July 1997. several East Asian countries 
experienced serious currency devaluations. During the crisis. the 
market values of the Malaysia ringgit. the Thai baht and the 
Korean won that moved to managed float had dropped to nearly 
half of the pre-crisis level until January 1998. It was after the end 
of January 1998 when these currencies were almost stabilized. We 
thus estimated equa디on (5) from February 1st 1998. 
Table 5 summarizes the estimation results. Overall. compared 
with those in Table 4. the adjusted R2 ’s of the estimated equations 
in most of the time zones dropped down dramatically in a l1 
countries. This implies that the East Asian currencies increased 
their idiosyncratic flexibility after the crisis .. The estimated coef-
fícients. however. showed different characteristics depending on the 
time zones. 
During the time zones when both East Asian and European 
markets were closed. most of the East Asian currencies kept strong 
correlations with the U.S. dollar. For example. the coefficients of 
the U .S. dollar in Singapore 와ld in Malaysia exceeded one during 
TABLE 5 
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12:00-17:30. 17:30-18:00. and 18:00-19:00 in New York time (that 
is. 2:00-7:30. 7:30-8:00. and 8:00-9:00 in Tokyo time). The 
coefficient of the U.S. dollar exceeded one in Thai1and and was 
close to one in Taiwan during 12:00-17:30 in New York time. In 
Korea. the coefficient of the U .S. dollar exceeded one during 
12:00-18:00 in New York time. 
In contrast. when East Asian markets were open. the coefficients 
of the Japanese yen exceeded those of the U.S. dollar during 
severa1 time zones. For examp1e. the coefficients of the Japanese 
yen exceeded those of the U .S. dollar in the Singapore dollar and 
in the Malaysia ringgit during all of the time zone between 
10:00am and 8:00pm in Tokyo time (that is. between 20:00pm and 
6:00am in New York time).9 The coefficients of the Japanese yen 
exceeded those of the U.S. dollar in the Thai b하1t during all of the 
time zone between 8:00am and 2:00am in To쩌TO time and in the 
Taiwan dollar during 7:30-13:00 and 18:30-20:00 in Tokyo time. 
Even in the Korean won. the coefficients of the Japanese yen were 
almost equa1 to those of the U.S. dollar during 13:00-18:30 밍ld 
18:30-20:00 in Tokyo time. The results indicate that the East Asian 
currencies increased the corre1ations with the Japanese yen after 
the crisis during the time zones when East Asian markets were 
open. 
The above resu1ts have two noteworthy implica디ons. One is that 
the structura1 break occurred even in Singapore and Taiwan. 
Compared with the other countries. Singapore and Taiwan expe-
rienced relatively modest currency deva1uation during the crisis. 
These countries therefore did not have an explicit shift of the 
exchange regime after the crisis. Our resu1ts. however. suggest that 
the re밍me switches in other East Asian countries had a large 
impact on their exchange rates that had no regime switch. 
The other is that the structural break was observed mostly when 
East Asian markets were open. In genera1. news from the U.S 
markets. which may cause the f1uctuations of the U.S. dollar. tends 
to be revealed when the U.S. markets are open. To the extent that 
the exchange rates are f1exible. the impacts of the news from the 
U .S. markets on the East Asian currencies wou1d thus be reflected 
9The coefficients of the Jap밍lese yen also exceeded those of the U.5 
dollar in the 5ingapore dollar during 9:00-10:00. 20:00- 1:30 and 1:00-2:00 
in To함o time and the Malaysia rin잃it during 1:30-2:00 
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in the coefficient of the U.S. dollar during the time zones when the 
U.S. markets are open. In contrast, news from Japanese markets ‘ 
which may cause the fluctuations of the Japanese yen. tends to be 
revealed when the Japanese markets are open. Therefore. the 
impacts of the news from Japanese markets on the East Asian 
currencies would be reflected in the coefficient of the Japanese yen 
durtng the time zones when J터panese markets are open. OL[ 
empirical results support this view. suggesting that the East Asian 
currencies increased their flexibili~y after the crisis. 
C. l<'rom the September 2nd 1998 to December 29th 1999 
On September 1st 1998. the Malaysian government suddenly 
changed its exchange rate to the fixed exchange rate. It was the 
only drastic switch of the exchange rate regime that occurred in 
the post-crisis Eas1. Asian countries. In t.his sub-section. we make 
estimations after the Malaysian government shifted its exchange 
rate regime. Since αl 二 1 and α2 = 0 in Malaysia after September 
1998 , we estimated equation (5) for each available time zone i 11 
Singapore. Thailand. Korea. and Taiwan. The motivation of the 
estimation is to investigate how the dramatic regime shift in 
Malaysia affected the exchange rates of these East Asian countries 
that had no explicit regime s뼈tch 
Table 6 summarizes the estimation results. During the time 
zones when East Asian and European markets were closed ‘ 1.he 
East Asian currencies had strong correlations with the U.S. do11ar. 
The results are more robust than those in Table 5. In a11 of the 
four currencies , the coefficient of the U.S. do11ar was close 1.0 one 
during 12:00-17:30 in New York time (that is. 2:00-7:30 in Tokyo 
time). Except for Taiwan where the relevant time zones are not 
available , it was also close to one during 17:30-18:00. and 
18:00-19:00 in New York time (that is. 7:30-8:00 , and 8:00-9:00 iα 
Tokyo time).lO In the case of Korea. the latter result was in marke ::l. 
contrast with those in Table 4 where the coefficient was not 
statistical1y different from zero during the time zones between noo미 
and 6pm in New York time. Compared with those in Table 4. the 
adjusted R2 ’ s were still lower than those in the pre-crisis period i 11 
a11 countries. However , compared with those in Table 5 , we can see 
IO[n Thailand ‘ the latter time ZOIU‘ is 18:00-21 :00 in New York time 
because of missing data. 
>
ki@ TABLE 6 
CORREI..ATIONS WITH THE U .S. DOLLAR AND THE JAPANESE YEN 
: After Malaysia Pegged the Exch없1ge Rate System 
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that the adjusted R2 ’s became larger after the regime shift in 
Malaysia. This implies that the East Asian currencies reduced their 
idiosyncratic flexibility after the regime shift. 
During the time zones when East Asian markets were open. the 
coefficients of the Japanese yen were stiU statistically different from 
zero. In addition. the coefficient of the Japanese yen exceeded that 
of the U.S. dollar during some of the time zones. However. 
compared with those in Table 4. the number of such time zones 
declined dramatically. For example. if we focus on the time zone 
between 8:00am and 8:00pm in Tokyo time. the coefficient of the 
Japanese yen exceeded that of the U.S. dollar only in two of seven 
zones in Singapore. in one of four zones in Thailand and Taiwan. 
and in none of four zones in Korea. U Even when the yen ’s 
coefficient was larger. the difference between the coefficients of the 
Japanese yen and the U.S. dollar became much smaller than those 
in Table 5. The results indicate that even when East Asian markets 
were open. the East Asian currencies reduced the correlations with 
the Japanese yen and increased the correlations with the U.S 
dollar after the regime shift in Malaysia. Compared with those in 
2. Table 5 ‘ the adjusted R~'s increased in most of the time zones in 
all countries. The increase in the adjusted R2 ’s were. however. not 
large. 
The results have two interesting implications. One is that the 
structural break in Malaysia had a large impact on the exchange 
rates of other East Asian countries that had no regime switch. The 
changes were particularly conspicuous in Singapore and Thailand 
where economic linkage with Malaysia had been very tight. The 
other is that the structural break was observed when East Asian 
markets were open. To the extent that the exchange rates are 
flexible. the impacts of the news from Jap밍lese markets on the 
East Asian currencies would be reflected in the coefficient of the 
Japanese yen during the time zones when Japanese markets were 
open. In the last sub-section. the increased coefficient of the 
Japanese yen thus implied the increased flexibility in the East 
Asian exchange rates after the crisis. However. since 삼le coefficient 
of the Japanese yen declined after September 1998. the above 
empirical results suggest that the exchange rates became less 
llBecause of the data availability. the time zone in Taiwan starts from 
7:30am in To셰o time. 
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11exible after the regime shift in Malaysia. 
D. From January 4th 2000 to September 5th 2002. 
The introduction of in11ation targe디ng is in principle a regi me 
shift of domestic monetary policy. However. in a small open 
economy where the share of imports in consumption goods is large. 
it can have a strong impact on 야le exchange rate policy. This is 
because the import prices are a key determinant of targeted 
innation in such an economy. ln particular. when the U.S. dollar 
has been dominant in invoice currencies in their imports. lhe 
introduction of in11ation targeting might have increased their 
incentives to stabilize their exchémge rates against the U.S. dollar 
For example. in the appendix of In11a디on Report (July 20(2). lhe 
Bank of Thailand showed a simulation result that 10% depreciaiion 
of the Thai baht against the U.S. clo11ar would cause about 0.9% 
inc:rease of core in f1ation rate. It suggests that the exchange rate 
management is a critical factor to achieve the targeted in f1ation in 
Thailand. 
Korea started in f1ation targeting in September 1998. However. 
inflation targeting in Korea was not binding when Korean econorny 
experienced unexpectedly dramatic recovery. It was early 2000 
when inf1ation targe디ng became bincling for Korean monetary 
p이icy. 1n contrast‘ inf1ation targeting was binding in Indonesia ancl 
Thailand soon after its introduction. 1t is therefore highly possible 
that there was a structural break of monetary policy in 1ndonesia‘ 
Thailand. and Korea in early 2000. We thus estimated equa디on (5) 
from January 4th 2000. 
Table 7 summarizes the estirnation results. When East Asian 
markets were closed. the coefficient of the U.S. do11ar was close to 
onc during all of the time zoncs. 1n a11 of the four currencies. the 
coefficient of the U.S. do11ar was 핑reater than 0.8 during 6:00-19:00 
in New York time (that is. 20:00-9:00 in Tokyo time). Except for 
Taiwan. it was greater than 0.9 during 12:00-18:00 in New York 
time (that is. 2:00-8:00 in Tokyo time). 1n contrast. the coefficient 
of the Japanese yen was less th상n 0.1 during 12:00-18:00 in New 
York time in a11 countries. 
When East Asian markets were open (that is. during 8:00-20:00 
in Tokyo timel. the coefficient of the Japanese yen was never 
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most of the time zones in other East Asian countries. In contrast, 
the coefficient of the U.S. dollar rose up to the range between 0.75 
and 0.9 in most of the time zones in all countries. As a result, the 
coefficient of the Japanese yen never exceeded that of the U.S. 
dollar during any time zones and was less than one-fifth of that of 
the U.S. dollar during most of the time zones in 외1 countries. The 
results indicate that even when East Asian markets were open , the 
East Asian currencies began reverting back to de facto pegs against 
the U.S. dollar after early 2000. It is noteworthy that the structural 
break of the exchange rates occurred in other East Asian countries 
that had no regime switch of monetary policy. This implies the 
existence of a strong linkage among the East Asian exchange rates 
To the extent that the exchange rates are flexible , the impacts of 
news from Japanese markets on the East Asian currencies would 
be reflected in the coefficient of the Japanese yen during the time 
zones when Japanese markets are open. The above results thus 
suggest that the flexibility on the East Asian exch하1ge rates 
declined after early 2000. During most of the time zones , the 
adjusted R2 ’s were larger than those in Table 6 and were almost 
comparable to those in the pre-crisis period in all countries. 
However , the coefficient of the Japanese yen was sign피cantly 
different from zero during most of the time zones in all countries 
except for Taiwan. The result is in marked contrast with that in 
the pre-crisis period where the Japanese yen had no significantly 
positive coefficient except in limited time zones in Singapore. This 
implies that de facto pegs against the U .S. dollar after early 2000 
were accompanied by some degree of flexibility that did not exist in 
the pre-crisis period. 
v. Tests of Structural Breaks: The Case of Coefficient 
Dummies 
In the last section , we estimated equa디on (5) for each time zone 
in four alternative s밍nple pe디ods. The estimations were based on 
the assump디on that the East Asian exchange rates had three 
structural breaks: when the crisis occurred, when Malaysia 
introduced the fixed exchange rate regime , and when some East 
Asian countries introduced inflation targe디ng effectively. The esti-
mated coefficients suggested that the assumption was reasonable. 
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We have. however. provided no explicit test to support it. The 
purpose of the following two sect10ns is to provide formal tests 1:0 
explore whether the assumption was correct. 
This section tests the existence of each structural break by using 
durnmy variables. Given the dates of structural breaks. the tests 
would verifY whether there were signific와lt structural changes in 
the coefficients of the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen for each 
time zone. By using the intra-daily data. we estimate the following 
equation: 
ι1X( 二 constant十 β l' L1USD션 β2' L1JPY(+ β 12 .D( . L1 USD( 
” “ ” { ( 
十 β22 . D( . L1JPY(. 
where D( is a dummy variable which takes one after the break but 
takes zero otherwise. We c없1 conclude that there was a structural 
break in the coefficient of the U ‘ S. dollar if the coefficient of D( . 
L1 USD( is signific밍lily different from zero. We can also see a 
structural break in the coefficient of the Japanese yen if the 
coefficient of Dl' L1JPY( is signHìcantly different from zero. We 
estimate equation (6) for three alternative s없nple periods: (a) frorn 
January 7th 1997 to August 31 th 1998. (b) from Februarγ 1 ~;t 
1998 to December 29th 1998. ancl (c) from September 2nd 1998 to 
September 5th 2002. 
A. l"rom January 7th 1997 to August 31th 1998 
We first test whether the East Asian exchange rates had a 
structural break before and after the crisis. We test this by 
estimatin당 equation (6) from January 7th 1997 to August 31 t:~ 
199.5. Since the period includes t:he turbulent period when severεLl 
East Asian countries experienced serious currency devaluations. we 
excluded the period from July 2nd 1997 to January 31st 199:3 
from our sample period. In the estimation. the dummy variable D( 
takes one from February 1 st 199상 to August 31 th 1998 but takes 
zero otherwise. 
Table 8 summarizes the estimation results. In all countries. the 
coefficients of Dl . L1 USD( and D( . L1JPY( were significantly different 
from zero in several time zones. \Vhen the coefficient of D( . L1 USD( 
was slgn따cantly different from zero. it always took a negative 
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different from zero. it always took a positive value. The resul::s 
imply that there was a significant struc1ural break that decreased 
the coefficient of the U.S. dollar and increased the coefficient of tbe 
Japanese yen. The results of the formal tests are highly consistent 
with our findings in the last section. 
The absolute values of the coefficients of D( . Ll USD( and Dt' 
LlJPYt tended to be particularly large when East Asian markets 
were open. In Tokyo time. the coefficient of D( . LlUSD( took large 
nega디ve values during 11 :00-18::30 in Singapore. 9:00-13:00 밍ld 
16:00-18:30 in Malaysia. 8:00-18::30 in Thailand. and 9:00-18:30 in 
Korea. Their absolute values were almost equal to those of the 
coelficient of LlUSDt during the same time zone. implying that the 
structural break cancelled out the positive impact of the U.S. dollar 
that was obseπed before the crisis. On the other hand. in Tokyo 
time. the coefficient of D( . L1JPYt took large positive values during 
11:00-18: :30 in Singapore. 9:00-13:00 and 16:00-18:30 in Malaysia. 
and 8:00-11:00 in Thaíland. This indicates that the structural 
break caused a positive impact of the Japanese yen that was not 
obseπed before the crisis 
One excep디onal time zone was 12:00-18:00 in New York time 
(that is. 2:00-8:00 in Tokyo time) when both East Asian and 
European markets were closed. During this time zone. the 
coefficients of Dt' L1 USD( and I까 • L1JPY( were not significant1y 
different from zero in Malaysia. Thailand. Korea. and Taiwan. sug-
gesting no structural change in these countries. In Singapore. the 
coefficients of Dt . L1 USD( and D( . ,ðJPY( were significant. However. 
even in Singapore. their absolute values were relatively small. This 
supports our results that the structural break, if any. was very 
modest when both East Asian and European markets were closed 
B. F'rom Febn띠ry 1 st 1998 to December 29th 1998 
We next test whether the East Asian exchange rates had a 
structural break when Malaysia introduced the fixed exchange rate 
regirne ‘ We test this by es디mating equation (6) for the period from 
February 1st 1998 to December 29th 1998. In the estimation. the 
dummy variable D( takes one from September 1st 1998 to 
December 29th 1998 but takes zero otherwise. The significance of 
the coefficients of Dt' L1 USD( and D(. L1cJPY( verify whether there 
was a structural break when Malaysia introduced the fixecl 
152 SEOUL ]OURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
exch없1ge rate re밍me. Since the structural break in M려aysia was 
obvious , we estimated equation (6) for each available 디me zone in 
Singapore, Thailand , Korea, 없ld Taiw:없1. 
Table 9 summarizes the estimation results. In 머1 countries , the 
coefficients of Dl . L1 USD1 and Dl . L1JPYt were significantly different 
from zero in various time zones. The signs of the estimates were , 
however , completely reversed. When the coefficient of Dt' L1 USDt 
was significantly different from zero, it tended to be posi디ve. In 
contrast, if the coefficient of Dt . L1JPYt was significantly different 
from zero , it tended to be nega디ve. The signific밍lt coefficients were 
more conspicuous in Singapore and Thailand. The results imply 
that there was a signific없lt structural break that increased the 
coefficient of the U.S. dollar and decreased the coefficient of the 
Japanese yen , particularly in Singapore and Thailand. The results 
are highly consistent with our findings in the last section. 
The absolute values of the coefficients of Dt' L1 USDt and Dt' 
L1JPYt tended to be par디cularly large when East Asian markets 
were open. In T아인o time , the coefficient of Dt . L1 USDt took large 
posi디ve values during 9:00-11 :00 따ld 16:00-18:30 in Singapore 
and 8:00-11 :00 in Thailand. The posi디ve coefficient of L1 USDt 
implies that the total impact of the U.S. dollar became close to one 
in Singapore and Thailand after the structural break. On the other 
hand , in Tokyo 디me ， the coefficient of Dt . L1JPYt was significantly 
negative and its absolute value was large during 11 :00-20:00 in 
Singapore and Thailand , and 7:30-13:00 and 18:30-20:00 in 
Taiwan. This indicates 야lat a posi디ve impact of the Japanese yen 
that was observed before the structural break almost disappeared 
during these 디me zones after the regime shift of Malaysia. 
Comparing the absolute values of the significant coefficients , those 
in Singapore 없ld Thailand tended to be larger than those in Korea 
and Taiwan. This probably reflects the fact that Malaysia has had 
smaller linkages with Korea and Taiwan than with Singapore and 
Thailand. 
In contrast, we could see no significant dummies during 
12:00-17:30 in New York time (that is , 2:00-7:30 in Tokyo time) in 
Thailand and Taiwan. During similar time zones , the coefficient of 
Dt . L1 USDt was not signific없lt in Singapore and neither was in 
Korea. The results suggest that the structural break, if any , was 
very modest when both East Asian 없ld European markets were 
closed. 
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us dollar (a) 0.714** 





































1.041 .. * 
0.018 
(a)+ (c) 



































Notes: *** ** * indicate the sigr피l않nce at 1% . 5%. and 10% level. respectively. 
Dummy variables take 1 for the period from September 1st. 1998 until December 29. 1998. and 0 otherwise. 
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C. From September 2nd 1998 to September 5th 2002 
Finally. we test whether the East Asian exchange rates had a 
structural break when some East Asian countries introduced 
inf1ation targe디ng effectively. We test this by es디mating equa디on (6) 
for the period from 8eptember 2nd 1998 to 8eptember 5th 2002. 
In the estimation. the dummy variable Dt takes one from January 
4th 2000 to 8eptember 5th 2002 but takes zero otherwise. If the 
coefficients of Dt . L1 USDt and Dt' L1JPYt are significantIy different 
from zero. we can conclude that there was a structural break when 
some East Asian countries introduced inf1ation targeting effectively. 
Table 10 summarizes the estimation results. In all countries. the 
coefficients of Dt . L1 USDt 없ld Dt . L1JPYt were significantIy different 
from zero in several time zones. When the coefficient of Dt . L1USDt 
was significantly different from zero. it tended to be posi디ve. In 
contrast. if the coefficient of Dl . L1JPY1 was significantly different 
from zero. it tended to be negative. The significant coefficients were 
more conspicuous in those of Dt . L1 US다. The results imply that 
there was a significant structural break that increased the 
coefficient of the U .8. dollar and decreased the coefficient of the 
Japanese yen. The results are highly consistent with our findings 
in the last section. 
The coefficients of Dt . L1 USDt tended to be particularly large when 
East Asian markets were open. In To셔ro 디me. it took large positive 
values during 11:00-16:00 in 8ingapore and 11:00-13:00 in 
Thailand. Even in Korea and Taiwan. it took significantIy posi디ve 
values during similar time zones. The positive coefficient of L1 USD1 
implies that the total impact of the U.8. dollar became close to one 
in the East Asian countries after the structural break. 
In contrast. the negative coefficient of Dt' L1JPYt was. if 
signifìcant. moderate in its absolute value. In Korea and Taiwan. 
the coefficient of Dt . L1JPYt took significantIy a posi디ve value in a 
time zone. This probably reflects the fact that a posi디ve impact of 
the Japanese yen had almost disappeared before the structural 
break. In all countries. we could see no significant dummies during 
12:00-17:30 in New York time (that is. 2:00-7:30 in Tokyo time) 
when both East Asian and European markets were closed. The 
results suggest that the structural break. if any. was negligible 
































STRucrURAL STABLLI1Y TEST AFTER THE INTRODUCfION OF INFLATION TARGETING 
Sample pe끼od: September 2nd. 1998-September 5. 2002 
CD Singapore DoUar 
(6:00-]] :30) (1 1:30-12:00) (12 :00- 17:3이 
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us do11ar (c) 0.081 
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Japaness yen (d) 
(a) + (c) 





















Notes: *** ** * indicate the significance at 1%. 5%. and 10% level. respectively. 
Dummy variables tak.e 1 for the period from January 4. 2000 until September 5. 2002. and 0 otherwise. 
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VI. Tests of Structura1 Breaks: The Case of Rolling 
Regressions 
Until the last section. we have rnade estirnations assurning that 
the dates of structural breaks were known. The dates were chosen 
based on those of re맹rne switches in sorne East Asian countries. 
The choice. however. could be arbitrary par디cularly when inflation 
targeting was introduced. The purpose of this section is to rnake 
forrnal tests to explore when the exchange rates had structural 
breaks in Singapore. Thailand. Korea. and Taiwan in 1998 and in 
early 2000. By usìng the intra-daily data. we rnake rolling 
regressìons of equa디on (6) 없ld calculate series of t-values of the 
coefficients of Dt . L1 USDt and Dt . L1JPYt in two altemative s밍nple 
periods. In each s없nple period. 남le starting date was always fixed. 
We. however. changed the date of the structural break day by day. 
We fixed the en이ng day of each sarnple period by 51 days after 
the structural break. 
The first sarnple period was chosen to find out when the East 
Asian exchange rates had a structural break ìn 1997. We start it 
frorn February 1st 1998 and change the date of the structural 
break frorn June 1 s1 1998 to October 15야1 1998. We rnake the 
rolling regressions only for the tirne zones for which t-values of the 
coefficients of Dt . L1 USDt 머ld Dt' L1JPYt were sìgnificant at 10% 
level in Table 9. Fìgure 2 shows how the calculated t-values 
changed in our rolling regressions. The t-values vary depending on 
tirne zones and currencies. Their absolu1e values. however. 1end to 
exceed two frorn rnid-July to late Septernber. This supports the view 
that the East Asian exchange rates had a structural break around 
Septernber 1st 1998 when Malaysia introduced the fixed exchange 
rate regime. 
The second sarnple period was chosen to find out when the East 
Asian exchange rates had a structural break in early 2000. We 
start it from Septernber 2nd 1998 and change the date of the 
structural break from November 1st 1999 to June 30th 2000. We 
rnake the regressions only for the tirne zones for which t-values of 
the coefficients of Dt . L1 USDt and Dt . L1JPYt were signi다cant at 10% 
level in Table 10. Figure 3 shows how the calculated t-values 
ch없1ged in our rolling regressions. The t-values vary depending on 
tirne zones and currencies. Their absolute values. however. tended 
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STRUCTURAL STABILITY TEST AROUND SEPTEMBER 1998: 
THE CASE OF SINGAPORE 
( t-Values of Dummy Variables Estimated from the R이ling Regressions> 
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THE CASE OF TAIWAN 
<t-V:외ues of Dummy Variables Estimated from the Rolling Regressions) 
to exceed two frorn late Decernber 1999 to early 2000. Th1s 
supports the view that the East Asian exchange rates had a 
structural break around early 2000 when sorne East Asian 
countries introduced inflation targe다ng effectively. 
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VII. Comparison of Exchange Rate Volatility 
Until the last sections. we havcõ‘ investigated how and when th e 
East Asüm currencies changed their correlations with the U .S. 
dollar and the Japanese yen. We first found that the Japanese yen 
temporarily increased the correlat:ions with the East Asian curren-
cies after the crisis. We. however. found that two structural breaks 
reduced the correlations with the Japanese yen and increased the 
correlations with the U.S. dollar in the East Asian currencies. As a 
result. in terms of the correlat:ions. 삼le East Asian currencies 
beg.m reverting back to de facto pegs against the U.S. dollar after 
early 2000. 
The high correlations with the U.S. dollar. however , do not 
necessarily mean that the East Asian currencies have de facto pegs 
against the U.S. dollar. During most of the time zones , the 
coefficient of the Japanese yen was signi디cantly different from zero 
in most of the countries even after early 2000. This implies that de 
facto pegs against the U .S. dollar after early 2000 were 
accompanied by some degree of flexibility that did not exist in the 
pre-crisis period. 
The purpose of this section i쉰 to explore how the structural 
breaks changed vola디lity of exchange rates in the post-crisis period 
By using the daily data (the data at 11:30am in New York in each 
business day) , we calculate variation coefficients for the logged level 
of {‘ach East Asian exchange rate against the U.S. dollar through 
di띠ding its standard deviation by its mean. We also calculate the 
standard deviations and ranges f()r the daily growth rate of each 
East Asian exchange rate against the U.S. dollar. We compare the 
calculatedl variation coefficients as well as the standard deviations 
and the ranges among five sample periods: (i) from January 7th 
1997 to LJune 15th 1997 , (ii) frorn July 2nd 1997 to January 31st 
1998 , (iii) frorn February 1st 1998 to the end of August 1998 , (iv) 
from the September 2nd 1998 to Decernber 29th 1999. and ('1) 
from January 4th 2000 to Septernber 5th 2002. The period (i) is 
the pre-crisis period. We choose this period as a benchmark period 
The period (ii) is the post-crisis period when rn와ly East Asian 
currencies experienced dramatic depreciations. In periods (iii). (iv) , 
and (v) , 야1e East Asian currencíes were relatively stabilized. We 
divide these period by two structural breaks that arose when 
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Malaysia introduced the fIxed exchange rate regime and when some 
East Asian countries introduced inflation targe디ng effectively. We 
calculate the ratios of the variation coefficients in each sub-sample 
period to those in the pre-crisis period. If the ratios are greater 
than one. we may conclude that the exchange rates became more 
flexible against the U.S. dollar than those in the pre-crisis period. 
Table 11 reports means. standard deviations. and variation 
coeffIcients of the logged level of each East Asian exchange rate 
against the U.S. dollar for each sub-sample period. It also reports 
the ratios of the variation coefficients in each sub-sample period to 
those in the pre-crisis period. When we compare the variation 
coefficients of each exchange rate. we can easily see that the 
variation coefficients increased in all of the East Asian currencies 
after the crisis. The most dramatic increases occurred in the period 
(ii) when many East Asian currencies experienced dramatic 
depreciations. The variation coefficients declined after the exchange 
rates were stabilized. particularly after September 1998. However. 
except for Malaysia. the ratios were still greater than two even after 
early 2000. This implies that the levels of the East Asian exchange 
rates against the U.S. dollar were more flexible even after 2000 
than those in the pre-crisis pe디od. 
Table 12 summarized vola디li방 of the daily growth rate of each 
East Asian exchange rate for each sub-sample period. When we 
compare the variation coefficients of each exchange rate. we can 
see that the variation coefficients increased in all of the East Asian 
currencies ín the period (ii). πlÍs obviously reflects the fact that the 
East Asían currencíes experienced dramatic depreciations. The 
varíation coefficíents. however. declined steadíly after September 
1998. In particular. except for Taiwan. the ratios became lower 
than one after early 2000. This implies that the gro、.vth rates of the 
East Asian exchange rates against 남le U.S. dollar after 2000 had a 
stability that was comparable to those in the pre-crisis period. 
TABLE 11 
VO l.ATILITY OF D AlLY LoGARITHMIC EXCHANGE RATES AGA1NST THE U .S. DOU.AR 





































698 346 151 154 115 Observations 
32.99810 32.48628 33.63100 30.41252 27.61027 Me없1 (a) 
1.62919 0 .74824 0 .86809 2.19412 0.14761 Standard Deviation (ß l 
0.04937 0.02303 0 .02581 0.07215 0.00535 Variation Coefficient (( β )/( a)) 











@ Singapore Dollar 
698 346 151 154 115 Observations 
1.76894 1.68720 l ‘ 66677 1.57380 1.42827 Mean (a) 
0.04711 0.03132 0.05574 0.09667 0.01336 Standard Deviation (ß l 


















































698 346 151 154 115 Observations 
3.79997 3 .80094 3 .92322 3 .32496 2.49401 Mean (a) 
0.00300 0 .01672 0.20104 0 .60177 0 .01456 Standard Deviation ( ß ) 
0.00079 0.00440 0.05124 0 .18099 0 .00585 V하ia디on Coefficient (( ß )/ ( a )) 
0.13512 0.75373 8.77787 3 1.00183 Ratio of V，값iation Coefficient (*) 











698 346 151 154 115 Observations 
1222.00391 1218.52738 141 1.04897 1114.13485 872.28918 Mean ( a ) 
79.53863 63.61473 11 1. 11731 325.85641 19.45144 Standard Deviation ( ß ) 
0.06509 0.05221 0.07875 0 .29247 0.02230 Variation Coefficient (( ß )/ ( a )) 
2.91887 
(Table Continued) 
2 .34116 3.53141 13.11587 Ratio of Variation Coefficient (*) 




















































698 346 151 154 115 Observations 
42.48220 37.83687 41.53185 38.82225 25.74256 Me따1 (a) 
2.44786 1.29093 2.50036 7.32354 0.51792 Standard Deviation ( β ) 
0.05762 0.03412 0.06020 0.18864 0.02012 Variation Coefficient ((ß)/(a)) 
2.89396 1.69580 2.99232 9.37620 Ratio of Variation Coefficient (*) 











698 346 151 154 115 Observations 
117.71373 116.15569 135.41444 122.81633 121.01932 Mean (a) 
8.79628 8.27495 6.55690 5.49671 4.16006 Standard Deviation (ß) 






Note: (*) They are relative variation coefficients ag킹nst the va1ue of the pre-crisis period indicated in column (a). 
2.07243 1.40860 1.30197 Ratio of Variation Coefficient (*) 
} 4* TABLE 12 
VOIATlLIπ OF D AlLY CHANGE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE AGAlNST THE U.S. DOLlAR 







































697 346 151 154 115 Observations 









0.00163 Standard Deviation 
Ratio of Standard Deviation (*) 
Ma엉mum 0.05238 0.02749 0.02482 0.05925 0.00909 
-0.05392 -0.02829 -0.02005 -0.05838 -0 .00928 Minimum 
0.10631 0.05578 0 .04487 0 .11763 0 .01838 Range 
Ratio of R밍1ge (**) 
(Î) Singapore Dollar 

























Ratio of Standard Deviation (* ) 1.03815 2 .46661 3 .68172 
0.01432 0 .02229 0.03062 0.02277 0 .01161 Ma잉mum 
-0.01320 -0.01876 -0.03452 
0.06513 
-0.02532 -0 .01140 Minimum 
0.02753 0.04105 0.04810 0 .02301 Range 
Ra디o of Range (**) 1.19615 
ffable Continued) 
1.78382 2.83024 2 .08988 





















































Ratio of Standard Deviation (*) 0.37549 2.14127 5.89624 6.58092 
0.01267 0.01473 0 .05623 0.06519 0.01221 Maximum 
-0.01313 -0.03831 -0.06192 -0.06513 -0.01235 Minimum 





1 l.05011 2.15940 4.81033 









(a)l 997. 1. 7-
1997.6.15 
697 346 151 154 115 Observations 
0.00009 -0.00040 -0.00137 0.00370 -0.00007 Mean 
0.00609 0.00927 0.02404 0.04160 0.00687 Standard Deviation 
0.88736 1.35031 3 .50096 6.05644 Ra디o of Standard Deviation (*) 
0.03287 0.03415 0.12352 0.15943 0.02093 Ma엄mum 
-0.02704 -0.02572 -0.08148 -0. 17148 -0.02650 Minimum 































697 346 151 154 115 Observations 































0.00796 0.01760 0 .02164 0.00791 Standard De띠ation 
1.00545 2 .22371 2.73506 Ratio of Standard Deviation (*) 
0.02914 0 .02842 0 .05434 0.15906 0.03689 Ma잉mum 
-0.02703 -0.03036 -0.06836 -0 .05303 -0 .04386 Minimum 







0.69559 0 .72794 1.51939 











697 346 151 154 115 Observations 
0 .00020 -0.000858 0.00078 0.00066 -0.00014 Me킹1 
0.00632 0 .01321 0.01052 0.00870 0 .00861 Standard Deviation 
0.73419 1.53423 1.22205 1.01003 Ra디o of Standard Deviation (*) 
0.02129 0.05567 0.02455 0.02038 0 .02788 Ma잉mum 
-0.02416 -0 .07485 -0.03592 -0.04347 -0 .03232 Minimum 
0 .04545 0 . 13052 0.06048 0.06385 0 .06020 R밍1ge 
Ratio of Range (**) 0.75494 
Notes: (*) They are relative variation coefficients against the value of the pre-crisis period indicated in column (a). 
(**) They are relative r없1ge against the value of the pre-crisis period indicated in column (a). 
2.16807 1.00457 1.06063 
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VIII. Alternative Interpretations 
Unti1 the 1ast sections , we havε demonstrated that the East Asian 
cuγrencies had changed their corre1ations with the U .S. dollar and 
th(‘ Japanese yen in September 1998 and in ear1y 2000. We 
interpreted that the structural breaks arose when Ma1aysia 
introduced the fixed exchange rate regime and when some E2.St 
Asi.an countries introduced inf1ation targe디ng effective1y. However , 
severa1 other interpreta디ons may be possib1e. 
One interpretation is that a change of macroeconomic corre1ation 
a1tered the corre1ations of East Asian exchange rates with the U .S. 
dollar and the Japanese yen. Throughout the late 1990s, the U.S. 
economy was booming, while the Japanese economy experienced a 
10ng stagnation. Since East Asian countries had shown a sharp 
recovery after the mid며e of 1998 , macroeconomic fundamenta1s 
had a strong positive correlation with those of Japan in 야le first 
half of 1998 but with those of the United States after the latter 
half of 1998. To the extent that macroeconomic fundamentals affect 
exchange‘ rates , this may provide a parUal exp1anation on sources 
of the structural change in Septernber 1998. 
However , since the change of macroeconomic correlation was 
gradual, it cannot explain a drastic structural change that we 
observed in the previous section.s, par디cularly that in ear1y 2000. 
More importantly , the feature of the structural change was different 
in different time zones. 1t is hard to explain the feature in terms of 
macroeconomic correlaUons. 
The other interpretation is that a structural change of t.:1e 
Japanese yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate changed the corre1ations of 
the East Asian exchange rates. The Japanese yen/U.S. dollar 
exch없1ge rate had series of structura1 breaks during the past 
decade. F'igure 4 draws movements of the yen/dollar exchange rates 
from January 1994 to December 200 1. It shows that the yen 
steadily depreciated against the U .S. dollar and that the rate of 
depreciation was accelerated after November 1997. The trend of the 
depreciation had continued until the end of July 1998. However , 
after August 1998, the yen , in turn , started apprecia디ng against 
the U.S. dollar and that the appreciation had continued until the 
end of December 1999. This indicates that if the East Asian 
currencies had asymmetric responses to appreciation and deprecia-
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tion of the yen/ dollar exchange rates. they could have had different 
correlations with 상le U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen before and 
after September 1998. 
깐le yen/dollar exchange rates. however. had a tendency to 
depreciate after early 2000. If the asymmetric responses to the 
yen/ dollar exchange rates were important. the estimated correla-
tions would have been reversed and became similar to those before 
5eptember 1998 in the post-crisis period. We. however. found that 
the estimated correlations never returned to those before 5eptember 
1998. Instead. the East Asian currencies increased correlations with 
the U.5. dollar after early 2000. The yen/dollar exchange rates are 
thus not satisfactory in explaining why large structural changes 
were observed in early 2000. 
IX. Concluding remarks 
In this paper. we investigated 야le determinants of the post-crisis 
exchange rates of five East Asian countries: 5ingapore , Thailand, 
Korea , Taiwan , and Malaysia. Based on intra-daily observations , we 
examined how and when these five East Asian currencies changed 
their correlations with the U.5. dollar and the Japanese yen. 
During the time zones when East Asian and European markets 
were closed. the East Asian currencies kept strong correlations with 
the U.5. dollar throughout the pos-crisis pe디od. We , however. 
found two structural breaks in 야le post-crisis correlations during 
the time zones when East Asian markets were open. The first 
structural break arose when Malaysia adopted the fixed exchange 
rate. The second structural break occurred when Indonesia and 
Thailand introduced inflation targeting. The structural breaks 
suggest strong monetary linkages among East Asian countries. 
After early 2000 , the East Asian currencies began reverting back to 
de facto pegs against the U .5. dollar. 
A noteworthy implication from our empirical results was that a 
regime switch in an East Asian country had an enormously large 
impact on the exchange rates of other East Asian countries that 
had no regime switch. This probably reflects the fact that economic 
linkage among East Asian countries is 디ght in monetary and real 
transactions ‘ During the past decade. intra-re밍onal trade among 
East Asian countries increased dramatically. The increased intra-
EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES lN EAST ASIA 179 
regional capital mobility intensified the linkage of financial markets 
in East Asia. As a result, a regime switch in a country came tO 
have a strong impact on its neighboring economies and that the 
affected economies came to have another impacts on their 
neighboring economies in East Asia. Our empirical studies 
supported this view and suggest that the exchange rate linkage was 
verγ important to see why the post-crisis East Asian countries had 
a tendency rever디ng back to de fucto pegs against 삼le U.S. dollar. 
ln the present period , severa.l East Asian economies adopt 
different types of exchange rate regimes; Hong Kong kept its 
currency board arrangement and the Chinese yuan virtualiy 
maintained its pe당 to the U.S. dollar. After experiencing some 
transitional regime , Malaysia started pegging to the U.S. dollar on 
September 1 st 1998. ln contrast, Thailancl, lndonesia , and Korea as 
well as the Philippines and Taiwan have adopted managecl float 
since the crisis. The so-called floa디ng exchange regimes of the~e 
countries are , however , not really floa디ng. The de facto pegs to the 
U.S. dollar may destabilize the real “ effective" exchange rates of 
these currencies. To avoid another crisis in East Asia, it is a n. 
urgent issue to reconsider what is the desirable exchange rate 
regime in East Asian from a view of regional cooperation. 
(Received 29 October 2003; Revised 13 ‘January 2004) 
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